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The Hungarian Constitutional Court in Transition – 
from Actio Popularis to Constitutional Complaint
Abstract. In Hungary, the year 2012 brought a signifi cant change in constitutional review. With modifying the 
competencies of the Constitutional Court, the Basic Law introduced three types of constitutional complaints and 
abolished actio popularis. Actio popularis was a well-functioning legal instrument in Hungarian law since the 
political transition of 1989–1990. Up until January 2012 anyone could request the abstract ex post facto 
constitutional review of a law or regulation. Unlike the former actio popularis, the essence of the new system of 
constitutional complaints is to have standing requirements for the complainants. Furthermore, new types of 
complaints are designed to defend constitutionality against personal injuries caused by ordinary courts as well. The 
article aims to describe actio popularis and constitutional complaints with regard to possible comparison of 
weaknesses and strong points. The author argues that regarding its effectiveness the new system do not yet provide 
a complete substitution for actio popularis.
Keywords: constitutional law, constitutional review, constitutional complaint, competencies of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court 
Introduction
The Hungarian Basic Law,1 effective from the fi rst January 2012, has signifi cantly modifi ed 
the competencies of the Constitutional Court. Among several changes it introduced three 
types of constitutional complaints and abolished the former existing actio popularis. Actio 
popularis meant a legal possibility that anyone could turn to the Constitutional Court 
claiming that a law, legal provision or a regulation is contrary to a constitutional provision. 
The petitioner could also request the annulment of that piece of law. Constitutional 
complaint under former jurisdiction was to be lodged only in case of personal injury caused 
by the application of an unconstitutional norm. The aim of the new constitutional complaint 
mechanisms were to protect against personal injuries caused by ordinary courts and provide 
a possibility for constitutional review also in cases where the complainant cannot turn to 
ordinary court. Moreover, the Constitutional Court may supervise the constitutionality of 
legal provisions when applied in certain judicial cases and leads to unconstitutional court 
decision. This article fi rst describes actio popularis and questions if actio popularis and 
constitutional complaint as such could be alternatives to each other. The second part gives a 
brief summary of the new constitutional complaint mechanisms in Hungary and about the 
practice of the Constitutional Court in the fi rst semester of 2012. The author argues that 
concerning effective constitutional remedy the new system so far do not provide a complete 
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substitution for actio popularis. Due to the fast transition several methodological questions 
of fundamental importance have to be answered during the fi rst period of the operation of 
the new system.
I. The actio popularis
1. Actio popularis in Hungary 1990–2011
In Hungary, until the new constitution called Basic Law has turned into effect, approximately 
1,600 actions were brought annually at the Constitutional Court within the framework of 
the abstract ex-post facto review of law (actio popularis)2 procedure, which has no standing 
requirement. The ordinary courts adjudicated violations of the rights of the individual, 
while the primary duty of the Constitutional Court was to review the constitutionality of 
laws and regulations. Even in the procedure of constitutional complaint, the Constitutional 
Court could only investigate the unconstitutionality of the challenged law or regulation, and 
this investigation did not have as a mandatory consequence the retroactive exclusion of the 
applicability of the unconstitutional law or regulation in the given case.3
Therefore, the duty of the Constitutional Court in Hungary, instead of protecting 
individual rights and the rights of the community and of the adjudication of specifi c cases, 
has been abstract constitutional review.4 The Constitution and the over 20 years of 
constitutional practice interpreting it demonstrated that the democratic protection of the rule 
of law is in the interest of all members of the society. This was the assumption behind the 
legal intrument adopted by Para. 32/A (4) of Act XX of 1949 (the Constitution), the so-
called actio popularis.
Para. 21 of Act XXXII of 1989 (Act on the Constitutional Court), in force until January 
1, 2012, determined who was entitled to initiate given procedures. Anyone could propose 
an action to initiate a proceeding for the ex-post facto review of a law or a public regulatory 
mechanism, or for the redress of an unconstitutional ommission. “Anyone” was defi ned by 
Constitutional Court practice to include actual natural and legal persons, who could even be 
foreign nationals or stateless people. The Court protected the assumption of the physical 
existence of the petitioner; generally, this was not something evidence was presented on.
The vast majority of the Constitutional Court’s work consisted of the adjudication of 
these constitutional issues that could be proposed by anyone.5 With regard to the fact that at 
the political transition the Constitutional Court could not monitor the constitutionality of 
the entire legal system, as a consequence of action popularis, the cases that were heard 
came random. Alongside the fact that certain most important proceedings could be initiated 
by “anyone”–constitutionality in the democratic society was subject to the watchful scrutiny 
of the populus. The state effectively protected constitutionality with this broad opportunity 
2 www.mkab.hu/letöltések/evkonyv.
3 About competencies of the Constitutional Court under the Act XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court and about changes brought by the new Basic Law see in a nutshell The 
Constitutional Court. In: Csink, L.–Schanda, B.–Varga, Zs. A. (eds): The Basic Law of Hungary. 
Dublin, 2012. 157–167.
4 Halmai, G.–Tóth, G. A. (eds): Emberi Jogok (Human Rights). Budapest, 2005. 215–216.
5 About the abolition of death penalty, see Decision 23/1990. (X. 31.) CC. About the offi cial use 
of personal identifi cation number see Decision 15/1991 (IV. 13.) CC.
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for bringing an action, declaring that the creation and preservation of constitutionality is in 
everyone’s interest and right.
Over the course of the past 20 years, in spite of these internal values, actio popularis 
had become one of the most disputed elements in Hungarian Constitutional Court practice; 
one of the reasons for this was–as declared by even the president of the Constitutional 
Court–the unbearable workload, inhibiting the adjudication of the cases within a reasonable 
period of time. Consequently, the Basic Law introduced another form of protecting 
constitutionality; it eliminated the actio popularis, and enabled the bringing of an action on 
the basis of individual standing within the framework of a constitutional complaint, not 
only concerning unconstitutional decisions deriving from the application of an 
unconstitutional law or regulation, but also versus decisions or proceedings of an ordinary 
court or of an authority not providing the opportunity for a legal remedy.
With the elimination of the actio popularis, what has come to the foreground is the 
opportunity for anyone to go to the ombudsman and propose that in the case of an 
unconstitutional law or regulation, the Commissioner for Civil Rights commence a 
proceeding for an ex-post facto review of law before the Constitutional Court. 
In order to ensure a fair transition between the actio popularis and the new system of 
constitutional complaints, during the fi rst quarter of 2012, pursuant to the new Act on the 
Constitutional Court,6 those actio popularis motions could be submitted as constitutional 
complaints whose contents were originally targeted at the ex-post facto review of the 
constitutionality of a law or regulation and were not proposed by a person who would also 
have had standing to do so under the Basic Law. On the basis of the Act on the Constitutional 
Court, however, the petitioner of the terminated proceeding could only fi le the motion 
containing the constitutional concern in compliance with the law designated in the 
unadjudicated proposal, if his/her proposal also complied with the new rules applicable to 
constitutional law complaints (namely, Para. 26. (2) of the Basic Law)7 and the violation of 
constitutional rights referenced therein amounts to a violation of the Basic Law.
This means that even though as of the 1st of January, 2012, the ex-post facto review 
proceeding (actio popularis) that could be initiated by anyone had ceased to exist, the new 
Constitutional Court Act provided an opportunity for natural and legal persons to submit 
previously ex-post facto review of law motions as direct constitutional law complaints in 
such cases where the substantive content of their motion indicates a comprehensive 
compliance with the conditions applicable to the submission of a direct constitutional law 
complaint.
2. The role of the actio popularis proceeding in constitutional adjudication
The origin of actio popularis can be found as early as in Roman law.8 The word derives 
from the Latin words actio (action) and popularis (of the people). Many forms of actio 
popularis are known in constitutional law. When we mention actio popularis, this primarily 
means that anyone can initiate an ex-post facto review of law and can request the annulment 
of the law. There are states (e.g. Croatia), where in the case of such motion, the authority 
6  Act  CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court. 
7  See intra. II. 1.2.
8  Mercier, P. P.: Citizens Right to Sue in the public interest: The Roman Actio popularis 
revisited, University of Western Ontario Law Review, 21 (1983), 89. and Nótári, T.: Római köz- és 
magánjog (Roman public law and private law). Kolozsvár, 2011. 277. 
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conducting the constitutional review must take action, while there are some other states 
where the motion is only considered a proposal and it is the decision of the authority 
conducting the review as to whether to complete the proceeding (e.g. Israel). The type of 
constitutional complaint where the objective of the proceeding is the annulment of the law 
but the proposing party can only use this method of constitutional protection if the law is 
applied in his/her specifi c case, therefore he/she/it must show some kind of an involvement, 
is called quasy actio popularis (e.g. the Czech Republic).9
It was Kelsen, Austrian-American jurist and legal philosopher, who in 1928 fi rst had 
used the expression actio popularis in his work in the context of constitutional law. 
According to Kelsen, actio popularis is the strongest guarantee to enable the fi ltering out of 
unconstitutional rules. Nonetheless, he did not recommend the introduction of such broad 
standing requirement into Austrian law, because in his view, the possibility for abuse was 
too large, as well as the fact that the Constitutional Court would have certainly become 
inundated with cases.10
Ex-post facto review of law proceedings that can be initiated by anyone are exceedingly 
rare in European constitutional law; to some extent, Bavaria (provides an opportunity to do 
so although the other German states and German federal states do not employ this form of 
initiating a proceeding), Croatia, Macedonia Republic of the Former Yugoslavia, 
Liechtenstein, Malta, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The system of constitutionality 
review and within it the circle of those who can initiate a proceeding is extremely varied in 
the various constitutional democracies. In some states, such as Lithuania only a group of 
Members of Parlament or the Government can initiate the review of the constitutionality of 
laws, in Estonia not even Members of Parlament can initiate such proceeding.11 There are 
states, however, which provide nearly unlimited access to the legal institution of 
constitutional review.12 An exemplary representative of this latter group was the system of 
actio popularis in Hungary, operating until the beginning of January 2012.
Thus, the essence of actio popularis is that it is not necessary that the petitioner has any 
interest in the success of the proceeding, meaning that it is not necessary for that person to be 
affected. For the most part, the countries establishing the opportunity for actio popularis 
come from the line of post-socialist nations. Actio popularis could be the most important tool 
of direct democracy in a transitional democracy.13 In the peaceful and effective management 
of transitioning into a constitutional democracy, constitutional observations by citizens 
affecting legislative activity may have a signifi cant role, and this form of participation in 
exercising power may also greatly invigorate public sentiment and the sense of joint action. 
Thus, the introduction of actio popularis also refl ects a kind of philosophy of democracy. 
The establishment of a proceeding which can be initiated by anyone in constitutional 
democracies is not a shared European minimum requirement in the area of reviewing the 
  9 Sadurski, W.: Rights before courts, a study of constitutional courts in postcommunist states of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The Netherlands, 2005. 6–7.
10 Arjomand, S. A.: Constitutional development and political reconstruction from nation 
building to new constitutionalism. In: Arjomand, S. A. (ed.): Constitutionalism and political 
reconstruction. The Netherlands, 2007. 39.
11 Sadurski: op. cit. 6–7.
12 More about the subject in Study No 538/2009 of the European Commission for democracy 
through law (Venice Commission): Study on individual access to constitutional justice.
13 Sólyom, L.: The role of constitutional courts in the transition to democracy–with special 
reference to Hungary. In: Arjomand (ed.): op. cit. 312.
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constitutionality of laws and regulations. For example, in the case of Montenegro, the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe did not recommend the introduction of actio popularis, 
citing Serbian experiences according to which the opportunity places undue burdens on the 
proceeding court.14 In the Commission’s opinion 614/2011 dated March 28, 2011, however, 
it is stated that in Hungary the actio popularis was indeed able to fi lter out unconstitutional 
laws and regulations adopted prior to the effective date of the Constitution, during the years 
immediately following the political transition.15
3. The actio popularis and the constitutional law complaint – alternatives?
In legal literature, actio popularis is often presented as contrary to the proceeding initiated 
in the form of a constitutional complaint.16 The basis of the comparison is that while in the 
case of actio popularis it is part of its defi nition that there are no admissibility/standing 
criteria for the review of constitutionality, in the case of a constitutional complaint the 
authority conducting the review (generally the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court) 
always expects that the initiating party be somehow involved in the case. In the case of the 
constitutional complaint, the primary objective of the complainant is to obtain legal remedy 
for their own case, as in the improvement of their own personal or fi nancial position. The 
result of the proceeding can be the annulment of the unconstitutional law, just as in the case 
of the actio popularis based abstract designated review of the law; however, the annulment 
of the unconstitutional law from the perspective of the complainant is merely a tool to 
obtain legal redress in his/her/its own case. To the contrary, in actio popularis, the service 
of public interest, not the service of private interest, forms the backdrop. Although the two 
scopes of review can be contrasted from this perspective, the actio popularis and the 
constitutional law complaint are still not alternatives to each other; doctrinally, there is no 
obstacle to employing them side-by-side. In spite of this fact, in jurisprudence, the two 
legal institutions do not operate simultaneously in any nation. One partial reason for this is 
the workload limit of the authorities conducting the constitutionality review. A constitutional 
complaint with a broad scope and actio popularis cannot be employed in most countries 
without expensive structural expansions and operational reforms in such a way so the cases 
could be resolved within a reasonable length of time. The effective operation of legal 
remedy forums, meaning the realisation of the fundamental principle that the decisions be 
made within a proximity to the injured party, in an easily accessible and prompt manner, 
can suffer because of the complexity of the review system.
Contrary to actio popularis–the essence of which is that the Constitutional Court 
accepts a motion as long as the petitioner indicates which law or regulation is deemed 
unconstitutional and explains intelligently why–the substantive element of the constitutional 
law complaint is to set up the system of admissibility criteria, the essence of which is that a 
14 Opinion on the Draft Law on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro of the European 
Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission). Opinion 479/2008.
15 Opinion no. 614/2011. of the European Commission for democracy through law (Venice 
Commission) on three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the new cosntitution of 
Hungary.
16 E.g. Uitz, R.: May Less be More? Public Interest Standing and the Protection of Constitutional 
Rights. Lessons from Hungary’s Actio Popularis. In: Pasquino, P.–Randazzo, B. (eds): La giustizia 
constituzionale ed i suoi utenti, Publicazioni dell’Institutio di Diritto Publico. no. 57, Milan, 2006. 
89–117.
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law can be annuled only when its application in a specifi c case has led to a specifi c violation 
of a fundamental right.17 The admissibility criteria helps that actio popularis and 
constitutional complaints aiming for the annulment of a legal provision could be separated. 
Thus one can only request the abolition of an unconstitutional law in the framework of a 
constitutional law complaint, if the merit of the complainant’s case in front of the ordinary 
court is signifi cantly affected by the challenged law. Usually constitutional complaints can 
only be initiated in the case of the violation of the rights and freedoms of the complainant, 
while the actio popularis proceeding usually may be initiated in the case of the violation of 
any constitutional provision. 
The constitutional complaint and the actio popularis may work with similar 
effectiveness regarding the fi ltering out of unconstitutional laws and regulations in the legal 
system. However, while the constitutional complaint, as a strong point, is able to redress 
individual violations of rights as well, it is a unique characteristic, a strong point of actio 
popularis that the petitioner there acts in the interest of maintaining constitutional 
democracy. Actio popularis as a legal institution relies on the participation of people taking 
action in the interest of the public.
II. The new system of constitutional complaints in Hungary
In the fi rst few months of the Basic Law in effect, the Constitutional Court, alongside the 
drafting of a few substantive decisions mainly of lesser signifi cance, established the 
procedural and substantive conditions of exercising its new competences. The Basic Law 
has changed the competences of the Constitutional Court,18 a new fundamental law governs 
the Constitutional Court19 (Abtv.). Under the new legislation, the composition of the cases 
changed completely. In May of 2012, of 686 pending cases, 536 were constitutional 
complaints, while in former years the constitutional complaints only comprised an 
insignifi cant portion of the Constitutional Court’s caseload. In the fi rst semester of 2012, 
approximately half of the constitutional complaints were based on Para. 26 (1) of the Abtv. 
(old type complaints), over a third were based on Para.  26 (2) of the Abtv. (direct complaint) 
and a smaller percentage was based on Para. 27 of the Abtv. (real complaint).20 The primary 
competence of the Constitutional Court has therefore shifted from the ex-post facto abstract 
review of laws to the adjudication of constitutional complaints.
Over the course of its preparation, during the fi rst half of the year of its operation 
under the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court had prepared the intake of pending 
constitutional complaints supplemented on the basis of the Basic Law and also complaints 
initiated on the basis of a motion for an ex-post facto review of laws, submitted prior to 
January 1, 2012. Additionally, the general and specifi c tasks and their associated procedures 
in connection with the new constitutional complaints gained defi nition in the new 
organisational system.21 During the fi rst semester of 2012, in addition to the continuous 
17 Sadurski: op. cit. 7.
18 The Basic Law of Hungary (25 April 2011) Art. 24.
19 Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court.
20 www.mkab.hu/statisztika/2012.
21 Under the new legislation the Constitutional Court consists of 15 judges instead of the former 
11, and brings its decisions either in plenary session, in 5 member divisions or in a single judge 
procedure. See Decision I/2012 (I. 3) about the procedural rules of the Constitutional Court, I. chapter.
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discussion of procedural issues, the Court had clarifi ed many dilemmas of a substantive 
nature as well. The discussion of procedural rules developed in connection with the 
adjudicability of constitutional complaints of various types on the merits (admissibility). It 
is well known that the procedure itself is also a substance:22 If constitutional law complaints 
are stuck as early as the intake procedure stage because of the strict conditions, few 
constitutional complaints remain to be decided on the merits. On the other hand, if the 
admissibility criteria are not self evident, abuses may take place during the intake stage of 
the case, or the inconsistent practice may violate the rule of law, a fundamental pillar of 
constitutional democracy.
 
1. The three types of constitutional complaints
Pursuant to Para. 24 (2) (c) of the Basic Law, on the basis of a constitutional complaint, the 
Constitutional Court reviews the compliance of the law or regulation applied in the given 
case with the Basic Law (old type and direct constitutional law complaint). Pursuant to 
Para. 24 (2) (d) of the Basic Law, on the basis of the constitutional complaint, the 
Constitutional Court also reviews the compliance of the court decision with the Basic Law 
(new type, real complaint). By breaking down the rules contained in the Basic Law, the Act 
on the Constitutional Court established three categories of constitutional complaints.
1.1. The old type complaint
Pursuant to Para. 26 (1) of the Abtv. according to Para. 24 (2) (c) of the Basic Law, a person 
or organisation affected in an individual case may turn to the Constitutional Court with a 
constitutional complaint, as long as over the course of the application of an unconstitutional 
law in the court proceeding conducted in the matter, a violation of his/her/its rights has 
occurred and he/she/it had already exhausted available legal remedies or legal redress is 
unavailable. This is what we call the old type constitutional law complaint.
Constitutional complaints submitted pursuant to Act XXXII of 1989 remained pending 
also as old type constitutional complaints, as long as pursuant to the decree of the 
Constitutional Court, the complainant supplemented his/her/its complaint within the alloted 
deadline (31 March 2012) with the provisions of the Basic Law violated by the challenged 
legal instrument and associated information regarding related constitutional correlations, as 
well as the certifi cation of legal representation required by the new Abtv. 
Pursuant to Para. 73 (1) of the Abtv., in pending cases before the Constitutional Court, 
the proceeding of the Constitutional Court must be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of the Abtv., if the case can be examined in conjunction with the mandates of the 
Basic Law and the standing of the petitioner is established pursuant to the provisions of the 
new Abtv. In case of constitutional law complaints originally submitted prior to December 
31, 2011 and still pending on January 1, 2012, in its decree ordering the supplementation of 
the motion, the Constitutional Court also set a deadline of March 31, 2012. 
1.2. The direct constitutional complaint
Pursuant to Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv., unlike in Section (1), as an exception, the proceeding 
of the Constitutional Court can commence when by virtue of the application or effect of the 
unconstitutional provision the violation of the fi ling party’s rights had occurred directly, 
22 Tóth, G. A.: Az eljárási alkotmányosság tartalma (The meaning of procedural 
constitutionality). Fundamentum, (2004) 3, 5–33.
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without a court decision, and no legal remedy is available to redress the unconstitutional 
situation, or the petitioners had already exhausted their legal remedies. This is what is called 
a direct constitutional complaint.
Newly submitted motions that are based on actio popularis motions from before 2012 
are also treated as direct constitutional complaints. In the case of such constitutional 
complaints, it was also a condition (although the petitioners did not generally take this into 
account) that if the legal regulatory framework enabled the petitioner to turn to an authority 
or a court, they had to exhaust such opportunities for legal remedy.
From a constitutional law perspective, many have considered it worrysome that 
pending proceedings on December 31, 2011 cannot be completed pursuant to previously 
valid law. More moderate opinions merely thought it desirable that those motions which 
request the completion of a proceeding regarding a violation of the Constitution which at 
the same time can be interpreted as a violation of the Basic Law should be allowed to be 
resubmitted in some form to the Constitutional Court.23
As a result of the transitional provisions, many motions previously submitted as actio 
popularis became fi ltered as constitutional complaints through the admissibility procedure. 
The legislator provided a solution in order to keep the petitioners who have been waiting, in 
some cases, for many years, from feeling deprived of their constitutional rights. En masse, 
however, transforming motions indicating unconstitutionality in abstracto into acceptable 
constitutional complaints will certainly not be successful, because the original complaints 
were not designed to show injury to an individual’s rights.
1.3. The real constitutional complaint
Pursuant to Para. 27 of the Abtv., according to Para. 24 (2) (d) of the Basic Law, the affected 
person or organisation in a given case can turn to the Constitutional Court against a court 
decision that is contrary to the Basic Law, if the substantive case decision or other decision 
concluding the court proceeding violates the rights of the complainants in the Basic Law 
and the petitioners had already exhausted their legal remedies or no legal remedies had 
been made available. This is what is called a real constitutional complaint.
The real constitutional complaint is known from German law and has been a desired 
legal institution in Hungary by many for a long time.24 Its practice–meaning the activity of 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany of reviewing the decisions of the ordinary 
courts from a constitutionality perspective–eases the development of uniform standards of 
constitutionality to be applied by the courts. After the binding conclusion of the lawsuit 
violating the party’s fundamental rights, the party can turn to the Constitutional Court 
pursuant to Para. 93 (1) (4) (a) of the Basic Law. The legal literature of past decades 
distinguished the German and Hungarian type of constitutional complaints with the 
adjective “real”. In the case of the Hungarian type, pursuant to Act XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court, the affected party could only turn to the Constitutional Court with a 
motion requesting the annulment of the law applied in her case. Above annulment, it could 
only be stated in individual, specially justifi ed cases that the application of the 
unconstitutional provision in the case of the complainant is retroactively excluded by the 
Constitutional Court. Consequently, in the past the party submitting the constitutional 
23 http://tasz.hu/fi les/tasz/imce/2011/Abtv.elemzes_20111027_fi nal.pdf.
24 E.g. Halmai, G.: Az Alkotmány mint norma a bírói jogalkalmazásban (The Constitution as a 
norm in judicial adjudication). Fundamentum, (1998) 3, 77–81.
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complaint could not request the potential review of the constitutionality of the litigation 
proceeding and of the ordinary court decision.
The institution of the real constitutional complaint is of crucial importance because it 
creates an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to monitor the activity of ordinaty courts 
besides monitoring the activity of the legislator. The review is conducted from a 
constitutional perspective, the Constitutional Court has to adjudicate whether the 
interpretation of civil law, of the law of public administration or of criminal law complied 
with the Basic Law. This so-called real constitutional law complaint, however, also has its 
limits in German law: Constitutional review is possible only if the Court’s decision is based 
on a material misinterpretation of the basic Law, with particular focus on the extent of the 
violation thereof.25 In the interest of preserving the allocation of functions, separation of 
powers between the courts and the Constitutional Court, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany established, as early as in the fi rst volume of published decisions, the designation 
of special constitutional issue (Specifi sches Verfassungsrecht).26 The Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany stated that conducting the proceeding, the fi nding and evaluation of the 
facts, the interpretation of the laws and their application to the given case continue to be the 
duty of ordinary courts and are exempted from the review of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, except when it concerns a “special constitutional issue”.27
The so-called special constitutional issue gained its currently valid form in 1964, in the 
decision issued in a patent law case, the “Heck’sche formula”.28 In essence, this means that 
the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany does not review the constitutionality of the 
decision in all cases, only when it concerns a special constitutionality issue. As expressed in 
Bürgschaft and similar, as early as in the Mephisto case, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany stated that without the suspicion of a special constitutional issue, the Federal 
Constitutional Court is not entitled to review a decision even if presumably it would come 
to a different conclusion on the merits than the court adjudicating the civil case.29
Laws and regulations somehow always impact fundamental rights. It would be contrary 
to the principle of separation of powers and consequently with the goals of the Constitutional 
Court if in all cases one could turn to the Constitutional Court as the fi nal judicial forum. 
The interpretation of laws and regulations and their application in a given case is the duty 
of the ordinary courts. Thus, in the framework of a constitutional complaint, one can only 
turn to the Constitutional Court if the petitioner can substantiate the probability that the 
constitutional problem arising over the course of the judicial proceeding is of particular 
constitutional signifi cance.
In German legal practice, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany fi rst examines 
whether the motion contains a special constitutional issue. Therefore, the error of the 
disputed court decision must be based on the court ignoring the fundamental rights or 
25 BVerfG 7 February 1990, BVerGE 81, 242 (Handelsvertreter), 253; BVerfg 19 October 1993, 
BVerfgE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft) 230.
26 Kenntner cited by Zakariás, K.: A rendes bíróságok határozatainak alkotmányossági 
felülvizsgálata a német Szövetségi Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában (Constitutional supervision of 
decisions of ordinary courts in the practice of German Constitutional Court). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
(2010) 2, 98, 102.
27 1 BVerGE, 418 (420), cited by Zakariás: op. cit. 102.
28 It is named after Karl Heck, judge of the constitutional court. See Zakariás: op. cit. 98, 102.
29 BVerfg 19 October 1993, BVerfgE 89, 214 (Bürgschaft) 230.
311THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN TRANSITION...
incorrectly applying the law to a signifi cant constitutional degree.30 First, it is those errors 
in interpretation that can become special constitutional issues which mean the fundamental 
modifi cation of the meaning of a fundamental right and in the context of a specifi c case, are 
also signifi cant in a substantive legal sense.
2. Admissibility in the practice of the Constitutional Court
Over the course of adjudicating constitutional complaints, the Constitutional Court faced 
many interpretive tasks. The clarifi cation of issues in connection with the admissibility of a 
motion and the development of procedure and doctrine will fundamentally defi ne how 
constitutional law complaint legal remedies will operate in Hungary.
2.1. Involvement31
Pursuant to Para. 26 and Para. 27 of the Abtv., a condition of submitting constitutional 
complaints is the verifi cation of personal involvement. Pursuant to Para. 52 (4) of the Abtv., 
compliance with the conditions of the Constitutional Court proceeding must be verifi ed by 
the petitioner, therefore it is not enough to refer to involvement in the motion, but all the 
verifying, as in evidentiary facts that prove that fact; when necessary, associated documents 
must be attached.32 It is the subject of this stage of the admissions procedure whether the 
petitioner can verify that the application or entering into force of the law or regulation had 
subjected her to personal or direct violation of her right(s).33
Even though in its decisions rejecting the admissibility of constitutional complaints, 
the Constitutional Court does not disclose all reasons underlying the decision, in related 
notes it does reference the details and results of the review. In constitutional complaint 
proceedings lodged on the basis of Para. 26 (1) and Para. 27 of the Abtv., the petitioner 
challenges a court decision. In this case, the review of involvement is generally problem-
free, as typically involved parties are those whose rights or lawful interests is directly 
affected by the challenged court decision. In the case of direct complaints lodged pursuant 
to Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv., however, the showing of involvement is a considerably more 
diffi cult task. In this area, one cannot talk of solidifi ed standards and consistently applied 
rules, trends can be observed instead. The Constitutional Court visibly strives to delienate 
the direct constitutional law complaint from the actio popularis proceeding.34
The problem is sharply outlined in the case of constitutional complaints former 
submitted as an actio popularis motion prior to the effective date of the Basic Law. In many 
cases, the petitioners have submitted their earlier motion requesting an abstract ex-post 
facto review of law without going into detail on the issue of direct involvement and suffered 
violation of fundamental rights. Cases were rejected, for example, where in connection with 
the reform of the pension fund system reform, the petitioners verifi ed their involvement 
with their private pension fund memberships.35 The essence of the justifi cation of the 
30 18 BVerGE, 85. (92).
31 This subchapter is based on the following article: Bitskey, B.–Gárdos-Orosz, F.: A 
befogadható alkotmányjogi panasz: az első hónapok tapasztalatai (The admissible constitutional 
complaint: fi rst experiences). Alkotmánybírósági Szemle, (2012) 2, 93–95.
32 Decision 3105/2012. (VI. 26.) CC.
33 Decision 3063/2012. (VII. 26.) CC.
34 E.g. Decision 3105/2012. (VI. 26.) CC.
35 Decision IV/2856/2012. CC.
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decision–similarly to other pension fund cases36–is that involvement cannot be determined 
because the referenced provisions only affect the complainant in the event of their future 
application.
In an other case, complainants, in constitutional complaints directed at the fi nding of 
government activity counter to the Basic Law in an effort to exclusively possess power, 
have based their personal involvement on the fact that in the text of Article C, Paragraph 
(2)37 Basic Law the word “everybody” is expressly set forth, a concept which encompasses 
all Hungarian natural persons and organisations, including the petitioner itself. On the basis 
of all of the above–according to the petitioners–anyone can submit a constitutional 
complaint if the challenged laws and regulations serve the forceful acquisition or exercise 
of power, or its exclusive possession.
According to the position of the Constitutional Court, the referenced law sections have 
not been applied against the petitioners, either directly or indirectly, and their coming into 
force did not affect them directly, their individual rights were not impinged upon by the 
adoption of the challenged provisions. For all of the foregoing, the Constitutional Court had 
rejected the admission of the complaint.38
The reasoning shows that personal involvement as an admissibility criterion sharply 
separates actio popularis and the new type of constitutional complaint. Thus, it is not 
enough to form the foundation of the motion that the petitioner is subject to the effects of 
the law; an actual, verifi ed, personal injury at law must be indicated to have direct 
involvement.
Upon the examination of personal, direct involvement, it is, however, not desirable to 
draw a distinction between petitioners as to whether they suffered an injury to their rights 
because of the entering into force of a law which has an effect on large numbers of people 
or because of one which expresses general rules applicable to smaller groups.
The doctrinal development of direct and personal involvement requires great effort. In 
the case of a direct complaint contained in Para. 26 (2) of the Abtv., it has been found that 
on the basis of those laws, and other legal mechanisms defi ned in Para. 37 (2) of the Abtv., 
which cannot enter into force directly by their nature (such as a resolution for the uniformity 
of law, which is only binding on the courts, or generally those laws and regulations which 
govern the proceedings of authorities and courts, etc.), direct involvement cannot be 
determined. The legal injury in such cases can necessarily only take place through a court 
or authority proceeding and action, therefore only an old type constitutional complaint can 
be initiated pursuant to Para. 26 (1).39
The directness of the involvement could be also defi ned by the weight of suffered 
disadvantages. The evaluation of the issue is doctrinally complex, however, because it is 
connected with the criteria applicable to the raising of the fundamental constitutionality 
issue contained in Para. 29 of the Abtv. It is an interesting problem how the weight of the 
injury to rights and the directness of involvement are interconnected.
36 Decision 3020/2012. (VI. 21.) CC.
37 “No activity of anyone may be directed at the acquisition or exercise of public authority by 
force, nor at its exclusive possession...”.
38 Referring to Art. 64 b) of the Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court and Art. 30 (2) of 
the Procedural Rules of the Constitutional Court.
39 E.g. Decision 3114/2012. (VII. 26.) CC.
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In connection with involvement, it is also a question as to whether a constitutional 
complaint can only be submitted in case of an injury at fundamental rights, or in case of any 
other right provided for in the Basic Law; possibly in case of the violation of constitutional 
values or in case of unconstitutional omission of the legislator. This latter problem is 
highlighted by those complaints that are based on the violation of the concept of rule of 
law.40
With regard to the issue of involvement, two more interesting problems are defi nitely 
worth mentioning from the fi rst half year of practice of the Constitutional Court, in 2012. 
The fi rst is that in the case of certain sector specifi c, code type laws (for example, laws and 
regulations concerning public education) it has been an ordinary occurrence that advocacy 
groups and trade unions submitted constitutional complaints with regard to such laws or 
regulations which did not affect their rights personally, only the rights of certain employees 
or the rights of practicioners of a given profession. In this case, however, the Constitutional 
Court held that only individual, specifi cally involved persons can submit the complaint, the 
union for example is not entitled to do so, as it is not directly involved.41
2.2. A fundamental issue of constitutional signifi cance
With regard to constitutional complaints, in addition to the Abtv., the Procedural Code of 
the Constitutional Court set forth additional rules. Pursuant to Para. 29 of the Abtv., the 
Constitutional Court shall only admit constitutional complaints in the event of a confl ict 
with the Basic Law which materially infl uences the court decision  or in the case of an issue 
of constitutional signifi cance.  Paragraph 30 (2) of the Procedural Code, however, lists this 
admissions criterion as the Constitutional Court shall deny the admission of the 
constitutional complaint if the petitioner does not claim confl ict with the Basic Law which 
materially infl uences the disputed court decision, or the problem raised is not a fundamental 
issue of constitutional law.
Even though the two forms of the statement could mean the same thing grammatically, 
the practice of the Constitutional Court to date shows that it could be a matter of dispute as 
to how the two “or” criteria can be interpreted. Contrary to the Abtv., one of the ways the 
Procedural Code is interpreted is when the “or” criterion in the law becomes a conjunctive 
condition. If the text of the Procedural Code provides an opportunity to deny the admission 
of the complaint, if it does not raise a signifi cant constitutional issue or this question did not 
infl uence on the merits the court’s decision, it actually requires that both criteria are met at 
the same time for admission.
As a consequence of the foregoing, even though for admission, pursuant to the text of 
the Abtv., it is suffi cient in and of itself if the problem raised has fundamental constitutional 
signifi cance, having made that fi nding, the Constitutional Court will also review whether 
the constitutional law issue had materially infl uenced the court decision. By the same token, 
even if the Constitutional Court had determined that the constitutional law question had 
materially infl uenced the court decision, it could be an additional question as to whether 
that was of a fundamental constitutional signifi cance.
It can assist in understanding the problem if at the time of examining the admission 
issues, we account for the possible legal consequence related dilemmas as well. The true 
question behind the admissions disputes is perhaps that it cannot yet be seen what the legal 
40 See supra Polish regulation.
41 Decision 3091/2012. (VII. 26.) CC.
314 FRUZSINA GÁRDOS-OROSZ
consequence is in the case of a constitutional complaint which successfully designates the 
fundamental constitutionality problem, but cannot show that it had materially infl uenced the 
court decision.42 
This dilemma is most understandable in the case of real constitutional complaints 
pursuant to Para. 27 of the Abtv., as here it must be weighed how the legal consequence 
resulting from the vacating of the court decision is warranted when the decision was not 
actually materially infl uenced by the signifi cant constitutional issue. Even in the case of 
complaints lodged on the basis of Para. 26 (1), this question remains in effect, but in the 
case of old type complaints, the legal consequence that is doctrinally easier to trace from 
the regulatory framework is the annulment of the law independently, while keeping the 
challenged court decision in force.
In the old procedural system pursuant to Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional 
Court, in the case of constitutional law complaints, in addition to the annulment of the law 
or regulation, the Constitutional Court could make a decision regarding the exclusion of the 
applicability of the unconstitutional law or regulation. The Constitutional Court could 
decide in a similar manner regarding the fate of the law and of the court decision. 
In the framework of a direct constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court had 
received such motion where the petitioner found the text “special exception” in Para. 26 (2) 
of the Abtv. and the “or an issue of fundamental constitutional signifi cance” test in Para. 29 
of the Abtv. unconstitutional. In the petitioner’s view, these provisions confl ict with Para. 
24 (2) (c) of the Basic Law because they might deprive one of the opportunity to submit a 
constitutional complaint to be provided in any case against laws and regulations that are 
contrary to the Basic Law. The fact that Para. 26 (2) only enables the injured party to attack 
a law or provision that are contrary to the Basic Law as an exception is a material limitation 
on the right to turn to the Constitutional Court and makes the initiation of the proceeding 
unpredictable.43 
In the fi rst half a year of practice by the Constitutional Court, few guidelines can be 
gleaned to assist in the defi nition of Para. 29 of the Abtv. It can be seen, however, that in 
nearly all cases the Constitutional Court had rejected the admission of the motions because 
of the absence of an issue of fundamental constitutional signifi cance. There were multiple 
cases in which the reason why the Constitutional Court did not see an issue of fundamental 
constitutional signifi cance was because the constitutional complaint raised such issues in 
which the Constitutional Court had decided in the past.44 It is important to highlight that in 
these cases the decisions did not employ the doctrine of res judicata, the reasoning did not 
refer to the fact that the Constitutional Court had already made a decision with regard to the 
given law or regulation, but rather it emphasised that a constitutional issue on which the 
Constitutional Court had already issued a decision on cannot be of fundamental 
signifi cance.45
42 Refusal of the complaint (Inadmissibility) was justifi ed with not forseeable or not satisfactory 
possible remedies, e.g. Decision 3003/2012. (VI. 21.) CC.
43 Decision IV/02229/2012. CC. 
44 E.g. Decision 3004/2012. (VI. 21.). CC.
45 Worries about res judicata [e.g. Decision 3005/2012. (VI. 21.) CC. or Decision 3083/2012. 
(VII. 26.) CC.] see http://tasz.hu/fi les/tasz/imce/2011/Abtv._elemzes_20111027_fi nal.pdf.
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Conclusion
In January 2012, a broad array of constitutional complaints had been introduced to 
Hungarian constitutional law. During the transitional period of constitutional review from 
actio popularis to a complex system of constitutional complaints, the majority of complaint 
proceedings resulted in the denial of the admissibility of the motion. The petitioners were 
experiencing the same problems in Hungarian law as the ones acting under the previously 
valid law. For the most part, this means cases in connection with the use of wheel clamps, 
rules on keeping animals or landscaping, local taxes (e.g. special taxes, fees), or pension 
regulation. Even these frequently received petitions rarely comply with the procedural and 
most of all, content requirements applicable to new constitutional complaints.
The development of constitutional democracy following the political transition in 1989 
was effectively assisted by the legal institution of actio popularis. Hungary could be an 
example to the entire world for how constitutional protection operates smoothly as a result 
of the mostly public-interest driven action of natural and legal persons. There might have 
been good reasons in Hungarian law for introducing the new types of constitutional 
complaint. The new system enables the monitoring of the constitutionality of court decisions 
simultaneously with the constitutional review of laws and regulations. The expectations, 
however, are rather high, as the new type of constitutional protection did not complete but 
replaced a fundamentally well functioning system.
